Friday, March 17, 2017
Sophistry is the attempt to persuade someone of some proposition or policy by the use of fallacious arguments. What I have called meta-sophistry involves accusing others of fallacies or of sophistry in a manner that is itself fallacious or sophistical. The meta-sophist cynically deploys labels like “sophist” as a rhetorical device by which he might smear and discredit an opponent. Where the opponent’s arguments can easily be read in a way that involves no commission of fallacies, the meta-sophist will instead opt for a less charitable reading so as to facilitate the accusation that the opponent is a sophist. Because the meta-sophist poses precisely as a foe of sophistry and fallacious argument and as a friend of reason, his brand of sophistry is especially insidious. He is like the politician who makes the loud condemnation of sleazy politicians a useful cover for his own sleaziness. (As I have documented many times over the years – e.g. here, here, and here – “New Atheist” writers are paradigmatic meta-sophists.)
Friday, March 10, 2017
At The New York Review of Books, Thomas Nagel reviews Daniel Dennett’s new book From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds.
Charles Murray versus the campus brownshirts: His personal account of the Two Hours Hate at Middlebury. Commentary from Noah Millman at The Week, Ronald Radosh at The Daily Beast, Peter Beinart at The Atlantic, and Peter Wood at The Federalist.
At Physics Today, physicist Richard Muller says that the flow of time is not an illusion.
Friday, March 3, 2017
In his book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim puts forward the following characterization of the materialist supervenience thesis:
I take supervenience as an ontological thesis involving the idea of dependence – a sense of dependence that justifies saying that a mental property is instantiated in a given organism at a time because, or in virtue of the fact that, one of its physical “base” properties is instantiated by the organism at that time. Supervenience, therefore, is not a mere claim of covariation between mental and physical properties; it includes a claim of existential dependence of the mental on the physical. (p. 34)